MIDDLE EAST CONTEMPORARY SURVEY

Volume Five
1980–81

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Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc.

New York and London

DS63.1 .M53 v.5 1180/81

Published in the United States of America 1982 by
Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc.
30 Irving Place
New York, NY 10003

and in Great Britain by
Holmes & Meier Publishers, Ltd.
131 Trafalgar Road
Greenwich
London SE10 9 TX

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International Standard Book Number: 0-8419-0825-7
International Standard Serial Number: 0163-5476
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 78-648245

Manufactured in the United States of America

Islamic Activities: The Year of Muslim Diplomacy

For over a decade Islam has served as an alternative ideological and organizational medium for relations between peoples and states. The outflow of the Iranian revolution demonstrated that the influence of revolutionary Muslim thought and activism could cross certain national, sectarian and linguistic boundaries without losing its fundamental appeal. The precise relationship between Islamic revolution in Iran and Islamic resurgence in Turkey, Syria, Egypt and Pakistan was difficult to determine, but their simultaneous emergence suggested the existence of a Muslim political network that was both vigorous and broad.

Following the Iranian revolution and the seizure of the Grand Mosque at Mecca—both oppositional events—states also began to assert their Islamic identities more vigorously. They began to speak not only to their own peoples, but to one another as Muslim states, and to deal with each other through explicitly Muslim diplomatic institutions. The Muslim dialogue between states reached an unprecedented intensity in 1980–81, and through a singular event—an Islamic summit conference—stole the initiative from Muslim opposition movements. In November 1979, the Grand Mosque belonged to a band of millenarians bent on revolutionary change through an unprecedented act of seizure; in January 1981, it belonged to Muslim kings, presidents and princes, gathered for a formal conference, in an unprecedented act of collective prayer. This was the year of Muslim diplomacy.

THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION (ICO)

At the very highest level—that of multilateral diplomacy—the contest for Muslim primacy was pursued in structured Muslim conferences and their affiliated institutions. The most important of these forums were organized under the auspices of the Jidda-based ICO.[1] The ICO was established in the immediate aftermath of the act of arson in Jerusalem's al-Aqsā mosque in 1969 to mobilize world Muslim opinion on the issue of Jerusalem. The initiative belonged to Saudi Arabia, in close co-operation with Morocco and Pakistan. It represented the fulfilment of a long-held aspiration of the late King Faysal Ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz. Over the next decade the ICO expanded its membership to embrace 41 States and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and opened its deliberations to include every perceived aggression against Muslim peoples. Through two summit conferences held in Rabat (1969) and Lahore (1974), and annual conferences of Muslim Foreign Ministers, the ICO was gradually able to construct a durable permanent secretariat, a battery of subsidiary institutions, and an effective financial arm, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB).

The three founding states had succeeded in curbing the impression that the ICO was primarily an instrument of their shared concepts of foreign policy. The Saudi Government was particularly sensitive on this score since it provided the bulk of the ICO's administrative Budget as well as being the driving force behind the initiative. An unspoken rule provided that the Secretary-General of the ICO should not be a Saudi national, and that the Foreign Ministers' conference should meet in a different member-state each year rather than at the seat of the permanent secretariat in Jidda, regardless of expense and inconvenience.

These measures and the subtlety with which the Saudis exercised their leverage did much to assure the international reputation of the ICO as being above the interests of any single state or group. Yet the ICO continued to reflect the prepon-

derant influence of Saudi Arabia and its initial partners, Morocco and Pakistan. These three were certainly the most active member-states, having among themselves hosted all the summit conferences and most of the Foreign Ministers' conferences as well. They also shared the key administrative posts in standing committees, mediation missions and subsidiary institutions. Thus they constituted the core of the ICO, around which other member-states formed secondary and tertiary circles.

Not all Muslim issues were treated as having equal weight in ICO deliberations. The ICO's Charter precluded discussion of the internal affairs of member-states; in cases of dispute between members, the Charter offered services of arbitration, but recourse to the Organization's "good offices" was not made obligatory upon its members. Only in disputes between Muslims and non-Muslims was the ICO mandate unequivocal. A clear set of priorities emerged over the first decade—at the top of which stood the issue of Palestine. While new causes were added to the ICO agenda, the Palestinians remained the core issue around which the broadest possible consensus was obtained among the membership. The progression of resolutions on Palestine was steadiest over the years; alone among liberation movements the PLO enjoyed the status of a full member.

The priority accorded the Palestine question had its roots in both remote and recent history, but it essentially reflected the centrality of Palestine to the Arabs and their claim to centrality in the Muslim world. The uniqueness of Palestine was given formal expression in the ICO's definition of its own role, being the only specific Muslim cause mentioned in its Charter—a document which also includes a provision for transfer of the ICO secretariat to Jerusalem upon that city's restoration to Muslim control.

At the end of a decade of rapid growth, the ICO had emerged as a serious competitor to the far older Arab League, and its Secretary-General had become a major actor in regional diplomacy. The ICO's economic arm, the IDB, played a growing role in development finance throughout Muslim Asia and Africa. But, just as the promise of this rapid ascent became clear, the ICO was confronted with political changes that imposed strains on the consensus over Palestine.

RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS IN AFGHANISTAN

Palestine's priority had remained uncontested throughout the ICO's first decade; but in early 1980 the ICO secretariat felt compelled to divert much of its energies to organizing a Muslim diplomatic response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—a member-state since the ICO's inception. The invasion was viewed by many as a test of the Organization's effectiveness. So clear a violation of a member-state's sovereignty by a non-member presented the ICO with a challenge of principle—while at a sentimental level the invasion brought widespread suffering and a refugee problem to a Muslim people which the ICO could not ignore. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were plainly distressed by the strategic implications of the invasion for the Gulf and South Asia as both countries, while professing formal nonalignment, enjoyed close political, economic and arms supplies' relationships with the West. The ICO secretariat reflected these concerns and orientation by quickly launching a diplomatic drive to achieve the broadest possible Muslim consensus against the Soviet occupation.

Their campaign culminated in an emergency conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers in Islamabad from 27–29 January 1980 (see *Middle East Contemporary Survey* [*MECS*] 1979–80, pp. 179–82). But the meeting yielded mixed results. Some members were tied by *de facto* alliances to the Soviet Union, while others were anxious not to antagonize a neighbouring Great Power on an issue which

TURKEY
TUNISIA
LEBANON PLO
SYRIA
IRAO
IRAN
AFGHANISTAN
JORDAN
KUWAIT
BAHRAIN
QATAR
PAKISTAN
BANGLADESH
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
LIBYA
EGYPT
SAUDI ARABIA
UAE
OMAN
MAURITANIA
MALI
NIGER
CHAD
SUDAN
YEMEN AR
S. YEMEN
SENEGAL
GAMBIA
GUINEA BISSAU
GUINEA
UPPER VOLTA
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIA
MALAYSIA
MALDIVES
CAMEROON
UGANDA
GABON
INDONESIA
COMOROS
SUSPENDED
MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION

they believed did not directly affect themselves. This reluctance to participate in any anti-Soviet gesture was particularly evident in the position of a group of states which were recipients of Soviet military aid.[2] Only after intense diplomatic activity and considerable internal dissension did the conference agree to suspend Afghanistan's membership in the ICO and to call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet forces.

However, the strenuous efforts to produce this result had placed a heavy strain on the fabric of the ICO: as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan continued into the Spring, the initial urgency had to be abandoned to preserve a modicum of peace within the Organization. At the regularly-scheduled Muslim Foreign Ministers' conference, held in Islamabad from 17–22 May 1980, the ICO reiterated its appeal for a Soviet withdrawal; but it also recognized the admissibility of a negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union and the Babrak Karmal regime in Kabul by setting up an ICO committee to promote this aim. The transfer of the Afghan issue to a standing committee assured that full conferences—which were intended to be demonstrations of solidarity—would not be forced to re-enact the divisive display witnessed in Islamabad in January 1980.

The standing committee on Afghanistan (composed of Pakistan, Iran and the ICO secretariat) held a conference of all the parties to the dispute on 20 June 1980 in Mont Pélerin, Switzerland. Among those who attended were a nine-man delegation of the Peshawar-based Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan, an organization of diverse groups, as well as other Afghan guerrilla leaders. The ICO Secretary-General, Ḥabīb Chatti, invited the "current regime" in Kabul not as a legitimate government, but as "a political movement representing a separate political opinion."[3] Kabul did not even reply to the invitation. The Soviet Press accused the ICO committee of having been established "on direct orders of Imperialist and reactionary circles."[4] Still, the removal of the issue to the standing committee represented a retreat by the core states and secretariat of the ICO for it was plain to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the secretariat that the broader ICO membership had gone to their limit of loyalty in condemning the Soviet invasion, and that to press for any further advance on the Afghanistan question in open conference would only endanger the Muslim consensus built up so painstakingly on Palestine.

With the failure of the Mont Pélerin meeting, Ḥabīb Chatti avoided denunciation of the Kabul regime and returned to discreet diplomacy. Sometime in the latter half of 1980, he secretly met the Soviet Ambassador to France and presented an eight-point plan for Moscow's consideration. The plan provided for a roundtable conference of all the parties involved in the conflict, creation of a national unity government, the holding of free elections and a Soviet withdrawal. A multilateral agreement to guarantee Afghanistan's neutrality would then be concluded between the new Afghan Government and the Soviet Union, the US, China, Iran and Pakistan. The Soviet response to this plan was reported to have been "vague." With this rebuff, the ICO's diplomatic initiative came to a halt.[5]

The Soviet Union took advantage of the collapse of the ICO initiative to convene its own international Muslim conference in Tashkent in September 1980. Although organized by the Muslim Religious Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the event was in fact under direct Moscow auspices, and had been planned before the invasion of Afghanistan to mark the opening of the fifteenth Islamic century; but it now emerged as an event designed to disarm foreign Muslim criticism. At the direction of the Mufti Ziiautdin Babakhanov, Chairman of the sponsoring Religious Board and the spiritual guide of Soviet Muslims, more than 170 foreign *'ulamā'*, lay Muslim activists and officials from Religious Affairs

Ministries were invited to Tashkent.[6] The ICO secretariat offered no comment on the Tashkent conference; but the Saudi Shaykh Muḥammad 'Alī al-Ḥarakān, Secretary-General of the Mecca-based Muslim World League (MWL; *Rābitat al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*) spoke out against it. (The Shaykh has long been responsible for spreading Saudi influence among Muslim organizations abroad.) As the Tashkent conference approached, he called on those Muslims invited to boycott the proceedings.[7]

The attendance at Tashkent was less than might have been expected under the circumstances which prevailed before the invasion of Afghanistan, but a credible number of Muslim guests did attend. Among them were the Sudanese *Ansār* leader, Sādiq al-Raḥmān al-Mahdī, and officials from religious institutes and Ministries of several ICO member-states. The foreign participants prayed together in Tashkent's principal mosque, and some gave the Soviet media statements praising the religious freedom enjoyed by Soviet Muslims. Soviet ME policy was also hailed by delegates from sympathetic States. Thus Syria's Minister of Awqāf (Religious Endowments), Muḥammad al-Khatīb, claimed the USSR "invariably comes out in support of the peoples resisting invaders, including those who usurped the rights of the Arab people of Palestine, who captured the great sacred shrines of Jerusalem."[8]

Western sources reported that dissenting delegates attempted to bring the question of Afghanistan to a debate, but failed. The conference ended without formally issuing a resolution.[9] But there could be little doubt that most participants did adhere to the "Appeal to World Muslims" issued on their behalf to the media through TASS. The appeal denounced "the shameful Camp David deal" and called on Muslims everywhere "to intensify support for the just struggle of the peoples of Arab countries for the return of Jerusalem, the liberation of all Israel-occupied Arab territories, for the exercise of the right of the Palestinian Arabs to establish their own independent state in their homeland under the leadership of the PLO." The conference also issued a declaration of solidarity with the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples against Zionist aggression, and a statement on Jerusalem.[10] Around the core issue of Palestine, the Soviet Union had been able to sponsor an international Muslim conference and elicit a modest turnout, while pursuing what even some of the participating delegates considered aggression against the Muslim people of Afghanistan.

A short time later, a challenge emerged to the ICO's position on Afghanistan from the opposite corner when Egypt replied with its own counter-initiative through the League of Islamic and Arab Peoples. (For the League in its inter-Arab context, see essay on inter-Arab relations.) Egypt had been suspended from the ICO since May 1979 for having concluded a peacy treaty with Israel (see *MECS* 1978–79, pp. 223–24). The Cairo-based League convened a "constituent assembly" on 10 November 1980, gathering a sprinkling of unofficial delegations. In his address to the assembly, President Anwar al-Sādāt mentioned neither Palestine nor Jerusalem, but returned repeatedly to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan.[11] Egypt soon found its own allies in the fractured Afghan resistance movement. Some of the Afghan guerrilla leaders neglected by the ICO were invited to participate in a "week of solidarity with the Afghan people" held under the League's auspices during the last week of December 1980. Sādāt proposed the guerrilla groups should create a provisional Afghan government-in-exile. "The formation of such a government is very important for the struggle," he said. "When we declared the provisional Algerian Government here in Cairo [in 1958], the foreigners laughed at us. However, after a few years, that Government carried out negotiations with France." Sādāt also pledged to supply anti-tank and anti-

aircraft weapons to the guerrillas.[12] In a ceremony marking the close of the week, the League's Secretary-General, Sayyid Nawfal, presented automatic weapons and pistols of Egyptian manufacture to an Afghan delegation.[13]

Reports from Afghanistan did not indicate the presence in combat of any Egyptian-supplied weaponry. No government-in-exile was formed under Egyptian or anybody else's auspicies. Still, Sādāt's unqualified embrace of Afghan guerrillas had served his purpose of shaming the ICO. Its secretariat maintained a studied silence with its hands tied on the Afghanistan issue.

RENEWED EMPHASIS ON JERUSALEM AND PALESTINE

In a review of the ICO's activities in 1980, Ḥabīb Chatti insisted that the Palestine issue—although overtaken by other crises in the Muslim world—would soon be restored to its "principal position."[14] The return to established priorities became more important with the approach of the Islamic summit conference, scheduled for Mecca and Tā'if in January 1981. The ICO secretariat attached great significance to the summit, which had been planned for at least four years. Both as theatre and politics, the summit's success would hinge upon a convincing display of solidarity by the Heads of State; so it became essential to again identify the ICO with the issues on which the broadest Muslim consensus existed. The ICO secretariat therefore spent the second half of 1980 in attempting to promote a sense of urgency over the fate of Jerusalem, similar to that which had prevailed in 1969 on the eve of the first Islamic summit as a result of the fire at the Aqsā mosque. The trigger for the new sense of crisis was the passage by the Israeli Knesset of the "Jerusalem Law," which decreed unified Jerusalem as the eternal capital of Israel.

The ICO secretariat took six separate initiatives on the issue of Jerusalem and Palestine in advance of the summit. The need for this lengthy preparation was created by the institutionalization of the Islamic conference system and the increase in the frequency of the conferences themselves. A progression in the strength of resolutions on Palestine by successive conferences was widely regarded in diplomatic circles and by the ICO secretariat itself as an accurate measure of success; but it had become more difficult to carry increasingly tough resolutions from one year to the next. Nevertheless, the ICO secretariat and Saudi Arabia, as host, sought far more than simply a reiteration of past resolutions. The summit's preparatory stages were marked by six major events organized under ICO auspices:

(1) An extraordinary session of the Islamic Foreign Ministers' conference which met in Amman from 11–12 July 1980, coming immediately after an Arab Economic and Foreign Ministers' conference (see *MECS* 1979–80, pp. 175–77). The initiative was ostensibly that of the PLO Chairman, Yāsir 'Arafāt. Chatti emphasized that no issue other than Jerusalem and Palestine were discussed at the conference.[15] No other issues figured in the final statement.[16] In his address to the conference, King Ḥusayn similarly emphasized that "there is no Arab or Islamic cause other than the Palestine question."[17]

The conference reiterated past resolutions on Palestine and Jerusalem, but now affirmed the commitment of all Islamic States to sever relations with any country that recognized Israel's recent decision on the status of Jerusalem (the "Jerusalem Law"), or which transferred its embassy there. Those with established diplomatic missions in Jerusalem were urged to remove them.[18]

Chatti later reflected that Amman had "marked a turning point in the Islamic strategy for the liberation of Palestine. There we abandoned the stage of

resolutions of denunciation and condemnation, and declared most clearly our categorical commitment to face the challenge, and our firm determination to take all necessary practical and effective measures to halt the aggression."[19] It was certainly true that Amman marked the beginning of the ICO secretariat's exclusive concentration on the Palestine issue, and an effort to evoke a sense of a new chapter beginning.

(2) A full session of the Jerusalem Committee, chaired by King Ḥasan II of Morocco, met in Casablanca from 16–18 August 1980. The committee had been formed in 1975 both to set the Palestine issue apart as one of special concern, and to bring Morocco and Saudi Arabia still closer together in a shared Muslim activism. King Ḥasan clearly relished the wide diplomatic role provided by his chairmanship of the Jerusalem Committee, and Morocco remained the site of most of the preparatory diplomacy for the summit. 'Arafāt personally attended this session of the Jerusalem Committee. Its 21 resolutions were evidence of a marked stiffening of resolve on the issues of diplomatic missions in Jerusalem and recognition of the city as Israel's capital. A political and economic boycott was proposed against those not observing these decisions. The Committee also resolved to extend the Arab boycott system to the wider Muslim world outside of the ME. It established a three-man committee—President Ahmed Sékou Touré (Guinea), President Ziaur Rahman (Bangladesh) and King Ḥasan II— to carry the case for Palestine to Europe, the UN, the Vatican and the US. Finally, it resolved that the Jerusalem Fund, established in 1976 to arrest the "Judaization" of the city, be doubled.[20]

Of great importance was an ambiguous reference in the final statement relating to continuing the *jihād* for Palestine—a theme which had figured in statements by Crown Prince Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz and in other official Saudi utterances (see *MECS* 1979–80, essay on Israeli-Arab relations). The theme had an obvious appeal to the organizers on political and historical grounds: a resolution in favour of *jihād* at the forthcoming summit would both enhance the authority of the ICO and add a striking new theme to the final resolutions.

(3) A committee of distinguished Muslim jurists began deliberations in Tunis on 24 August 1980 on Israel's "criminal practices" in accordance with a resolution taken by the Amman conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers in July. Chatti presided.[21]

(4) Yet another extraordinary conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers—the third such conference of 1980—was held in Fez from 18–20 September 1980 to deal exclusively with the issues of Palestine and Jerusalem. In addition to a large number of delegations who attended were two West African Presidents, Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea. The conference added some new emphases to old resolutions and adopted a lengthy resolution on the emergent theme of *jihād:*

> The Islamic countries declare their commitment to the *jihād* because of what it embodies in its broad human dimensions on the ground that it constitutes steadfastness and confrontation against the Zionist enemy on all fronts: military, political, economic, information and cultural.[22]

This complex interpretation of *jihād*—made palatable to the less enthusiastic delegations because of its conscious ambiguity—was to serve as the cornerstone of the summit agenda.

(5) The three Heads of State who had been selected for the Jerusalem Commit-

tee's sub-committee met in Casablanca on 7 November 1980 to "look into the necessary steps to be taken to defend the issue of Jerusalem in the international field."[23] Their final statement suggested no plan of action;[24] but in early December 1980, the ICO convened a widely-publicized symposium in Paris on Jerusalem. Immediately afterwards the three Heads of State met President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to discuss Jerusalem.[25]

The purpose of the Paris symposium was to draw "the attention of the French public and, through them, the world public to the seriousness of the Judaization measures which the Israeli military occupation authorities are taking in the Holy City in a manner that is threatening the future of the Islamic and Christian holy places."[26]

(6) The final preparatory stage was the reconvening of the Jerusalem Committee in Rabat from 22–24 December 1980. Its purpose was to adopt a "comprehensive Islamic action plan" for submission to the Islamic summit. A final statement sketched the plan's aims: liberation of Jerusalem; liberation of the occupied Arab territories; and the establishment of a Palestinian State. But it carried no details of the means by which these goals were to be accomplished.[27] The details, contained in a secret document, were released to the Press only the following month.[28]

On the diplomatic level, the Jerusalem Committee urged Muslim States to repudiate the Security Council's Resolution 242 as a basis for a solution to the Palestinian problem—a recommendation in line with PLO policy and at variance with the position of several ICO members. On the economic level, the Committee reiterated a proposal to extend the Arab boycott system to the wider Muslim world through the creation of a Muslim boycott committee. For the first time, the escalation of ICO activity to a military level was seriously discussed in connection with the proposed *jihād*. There had been talk of Muslim military co-operation in the past, and since 1978 an Islamic Institute for Defence Technology had existed in London. A strategic and military conference was held in London from 5–9 February 1979 under the auspices of the Islamic Council of Europe.[29] But the ICO itself had confined past resolutions to the political and economic spheres. Now the Jerusalem Committee recommended the creation of a joint military command, and a military bureau within the ICO secretariat. The precise nature of this recommendation was not made public. The Saudi Foreign Minister, Sa'ūd al-Faysal replied evasively to a question about whether the ICO summit agenda included military measures regarding Jerusalem:

> Military measures? No military measures have been proposed. We have the report of the Jerusalem Committee. Some of its recommendations may be construed as having a military aspect; but there is no special item on military affairs.[30]

A month before the summit, the lines of the final Palestine resolutions had been agreed upon by diplomatic representatives of most member-states. The central concern of the ICO secretariat now was to forestall the intrusion of other crises and rivalries which could result in important delegations staying away from the summit itself.

IRAN AND LIBYA DISSENT

As the consensus over Palestine took shape in late 1980, a major challenge to the ICO's authority came from Iran. Its post-revolutionary relationship with the ICO

had been problematic from the outset since the foreign policy orientation of the Organization's core States was offensive to Iran. For a time, the crisis in Afghanistan had drawn Iran closer to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan; these three countries worked together under ICO auspices to secure maximum Muslim condemnation of the invasion. But once the Afghan issue had been buried in the ICO's standing committee, the community of interests was lost. In late 1980, Iran again began to suggest that the ICO was a reactionary tool of Western Imperialism, and to call for the creation of what it described as a more authentically Islamic alternative. The apprehension within the ICO was that Iran would attempt to convene its own counter-conference. On 1 November 1980, delegates of five Islamic "liberation movements" were reported to have met in Tehran and issued a set of resolutions. These were clandestine or exile groups, essentially Shī'ī in membership, all operating in various ways against the Governments of Iraq, Saudi Arabia or Bahrain.[31]

The concern felt among the ICO's core States was given more substance later 1980 when war broke out between two ICO members, Iran and Iraq. Ḥabīb Chatti expressed his regret not only over the eruption of the war, but over its timing—"when the Islamic nation occupied a prominent place in the field of international policy and began to achieve successes in one of the most important issues, at least in the diplomatic sphere. By this I mean the application by all States and for the first time of a UN resolution connected with the Palestine issue, particularly Jerusalem, in the wake of Israel's proclamation of Jerusalem as its united capital."[32]

The demonstrations of solidarity which the ICO had organized over the fate of Jerusalem now seemed small beside the physical destruction wrought by two Muslim States arrayed against each other in war.

The war pressed the ICO into a test of its effectiveness as an instrument for the resolution of disputes between its own members—a role it had not filled with any conspicuous success in past conflicts. One of the ICO's finest moments had come before the Islamic summit held in Lahore in 1974 when a round of ICO diplomacy to get Pakistan to formally recognize Bangladesh ended in Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto embracing Mujibur Rahman in front of applauding Muslim Heads of State at the Shalimar Gardens in Lahore. This formal reconciliation marked the close of what had been a prolonged conflict—one that had defied the ICO's attempts at mediation until the final stage. It was thus at considerable risk that the ICO secretariat committed itself to active mediation between Iran and Iraq before the war had run its full course.

It is unlikely that Chatti would have involved the ICO so thoroughly in the conflict had he not believed that a ceasefire might be celebrated before, or during, the forthcoming Islamic summit. Only two tours of mediation on the eve of the summit appraised him of the conflict's intractability. While Iraq responded favourably to his initiative, the Iranians unequivocally rejected all direct negotiations with Iraq before its withdrawal from Iranian territory. (For details, see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian war: political perceptions.) Chatti himself told reporters that the Iranians feared that co-operation with an ICO "good offices" committee would compromise that principle. He said in October 1980 that Iraq had given evidence of a "great desire" to achieve a "clear, detailed and final agreement," but that he had found Iranian officials reticent.[33] In November 1980 he still found the positions of the parties to the conflict "irreconcilable."[34] As the summit approached, there were no signs of any progress; only Chatti kept repeating his "moderate optimism" and claiming that the ICO's members were "the only ones able and qualified to mediate to halt this war."[35]

Chatti clearly regarded Iran's lack of confidence in the ICO as an impediment to negotiations and as a challenge to the authority of the ICO itself. When Iran absented itself from the Rabat session of the Jerusalem Committee in December, its challenge threatened to blossom into an open repudiation of the approaching summit. On this, as on most issues, the Iranian leadership was divided, with President Abul Ḥasan Bani Sadr said to be in favour of participation. But a personal letter of invitation to the summit from King Khālid to Bani Sadr was misdirected by the Iranian Foreign Ministry to Prime Minister Muḥammad 'Alī Raja'i, who passed it on to religious leaders. They took an intransigent view. Referring to Iraqi participation in the summit, Ayatollah Khomeyni indicated that Iran would not sit alongside "murderers."[36] No Iranian leader could publicly dissent from that position.

Rather than retreat, the ICO secretariat leapt straight into the cauldron. Two days before the summit, Chatti himself led an unsolicited ICO mission to Iran, composed of the PLO's Fārūq Qaddūmī and the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan, Turkey and Guinea. On their arrival in Tehran, they discovered that Raja'i, their interlocutor, was in Bandar 'Abbas; the mission then flew south to the port city where Raja'i indecorously reiterated his opposition to Iranian participation at a public Friday prayer attended by the ICO mission.[37] With this rebuff, not without humiliating overtones, the ICO mission departed defeated.

At the same time Libya emerged as another antagonist of the ICO and as an ally of Iran. In late 1980, Mu'ammar Qadhdhāfī added a religious dimension to this dispute by claiming that American-manned AWACS aircraft were patrolling the skies of the sacred cities of Mecca and Medina. He called upon Muslims to refrain from pilgrimage and to liberate the sacred sites. A detailed refutation of these charges was issued by the Mecca-based Muslim World League,[38] and King Khālid addressed a group of pilgrims on Libyan "sedition" in a similar vein, charging Qadhdhāfī with "daring to encroach on the Islamic faith" through questioning the religious obligation of pilgrimage.[39] When Libya did not attend the Rabat session of the Jerusalem Committee in December, its participation in the summit became as problematic as Iran's. After a period of uncertainty, Libya sent a formal apology for its decision not to attend.

On the eve of the summit, and despite lengthy preparation, the summit's sponsors could not yet be sure that it would reflect credit upon them. On the one hand, two States with their own claims to Muslim primacy had refused to attend and, in attempting in vain to draw one of these to the conference table, the ICO secretariat had expended much of its credibility. On the other hand, the boycott of the summit did not spread despite appeals by both Iran and Libya to other members to follow their example.

THE TĀ'IF SUMMIT AND AFTERMATH

The summit gathering at Tā'if (25–28 January 1981) was an unprecedented theatrical triumph. The Saudi resort town was visually and aesthetically transformed by imposing buildings to accommodate the delegations. An octagonal rosewood conference auditorium and a marble mosque were the striking centrepieces of a newly-constructed conference complex. The setting was opulent, and the technical facilities highly advanced.[40] The collective prayer by delegation heads in the Grand Mosque at Mecca and within the Ka'ba, at the opening of the conference, visibly moved many of the participants, and impressed observers. At that moment, if only for one evening, an atmosphere of harmony prevailed among the assembled delegates from the Islamic world. A former French Ambassador to Saudi Arabia reflected:

> The way we others, we Westerners, impenitent Cartesians, look upon Islam makes us inclined to concentrate on the divisions in it. But let us mistrust our penchant for rationality. Much more so than the laic and materialistic West, Islam can withstand the apparent contradiction of unity amid diversity, even amid division.[41]

It was precisely this impression that the ICO secretariat and Saudi authorities had laboured so assiduously to create.

On another plane, the Tā'if summit was a complex, multilateral negotiation among States with particularist interests and often contradictory priorities. Alliances formed, clashed and compromised in the closed sessions of Foreign Ministers who met immediately before the summit to set the agenda, and in the private deliberations of the Heads of State themselves. The final resolution and the accompanying "Mecca Declaration" issued from negotiations fed by conflicting aspirations.[42] (For summit texts, see Appendices I and II.) The conflicting interests, it was hoped, would be reconciled through an almost exclusive emphasis on the question of Palestine.

THE SUMMIT AND PALESTINE

The resolutions on Palestine had been carefully prepared in advance, and were carried with the least debate. The preliminary meeting unanimously adopted the draft resolutions prepared by the Jerusalem Committee at Rabat, and named the summit the "Session of Palestine and Holy Jerusalem." The PLO delegation, led by Fārūq Qaddūmī, was in a triumphant mood.[43] The only setback at this stage was the fate of a joint Palestinian-Syrian proposal set before the preliminary conference, demanding the opening of all Arab fronts to Palestinian *fidā'ī* action. The proposal found no support elsewhere, and met with stiff Jordanian resistance.[44]

There was also a moment of apprehension in the Great Mosque where Yāsir 'Arafāt seems to have pressed unsuccessfully for the swearing of a collective oath by the delegation heads binding them to afford all means to liberate Jerusalem. Interestingly, this proposal had a precedent. When Anwar al-Sādāt travelled with Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhāfī to the Lahore Islamic summit in 1974, the two stopped in Mecca and, while in the Ka'ba itself, Qadhdhāfī produced an unidentified PLO official who asked that they swear such an oath. Sādāt first expressed doubts about the utility of this gesture, but then linked hands and swore with Qadhdhāfī and the Palestinian.[45] This time, it was 'Arafāt himself who pressed for a formal oath, but King Khālid managed to dissuade him.[46] According to Saudi Foreign Minister Sa'ūd al-Faysal:

> There was a proposal on the liberation of Jerusalem at the opening session of the Islamic Conference summit in the Mecca mosque. King Khālid asserted to the PLO leader that the meeting of Muslims near [the] Ka'ba in the House of God in a conference designated as the Palestine and Jerusalem conference is [already] a binding pledge by Muslims to liberate holy Jerusalem . . . I believe that the whole conference represents a pledge by Muslims to liberate Jerusalem.[47]

'Arafāt did not secure his more dramatic pledge. But many of the established political positions of the PLO won endorsement. Three resolutions and recommendations repudiated Resolution 242, advocated *jihād* for the delivery of Jerusalem as capital of a Palestinian State, and extended the Arab boycott of

Israel (hitherto adopted by Arab League members only) to ICO member-states. There were also significant individual commitments. At a time when talk of a "Jordanian option" figured prominently in the platform of the Israeli Labour Party—then still favoured to win the Israeli elections—King Ḥusayn's rejection of an alternative to the PLO in his summit speech earned the visible appreciation of the PLO delegation.[48] Turkey, the only ICO member-state in good standing to maintain formal diplomatic relations with Israel, downgraded them yet further on the eve of the summit. The principle that ICO membership was incompatible with formal recognition of Israel finally approximated practice. The single discordant note struck in public came from the Lebanese President Ilyās Sarkīs, who complained of the "armed deployment of the Palestinian resistance whose circle is expanding from time to time, contrary to its commitments toward Lebanon."[49] The PLO was otherwise free from reproach.

The hub of the Palestine resolution was the *jihād* proposal. The published version left the precise nature of *jihād* undefined:

> The Islamic States would like to stress in this resolution that *jihād* has an Islamic meaning which is not open to interpretation or misunderstanding. The practical measures for its implementation should be taken in accordance with this, and by continued consultation between the Islamic States.

This wording perhaps implied that the political and economic measures of the past did not constitute *jihād*, which had yet to be implemented; and thus suggested that the summit discussed military co-operation. If it did, then the deliberations marked an important escalation of the ICO's role in the conflict; but the confusion over the precise exegesis of the final resolution left the issue unsettled. On the other hand, the Jerusalem Committee's proposal for an Islamic military bureau did not figure in the final resolutions. Later in the year the Jerusalem Committee had to "renew" its appeal for "a military bureau at the [ICO] General Secretariat with a view to military co-ordination with the PLO and the Islamic countries in a manner that makes it possible to benefit from the Islamic countries' capabilities in serving the interests of the Palestinian struggle."[50]

PLO sources also claimed that the summit "made the necessary arrangements to open the way for volunteers from the Islamic States to join the Palestinian revolution." But they gave no further details.[51] Whatever the nature of these plans, the verbal commitment to implement *jihād* did mark the summit apart as the organizers had expected it would, and reflected the greater confidence of the ICO collective. Nine years earlier—at an ICO Foreign Ministers' conference in Jidda—a draft resolution calling for the creation of a *jihād* fund to aid the PLO had to be altered as the use of *jihād* created some discomfort among certain member-states which feared accusations of fanaticism. Ironically, Afghanistan then led the faction opposed to the usage, and Egypt led the faction in favour. Those reservations were now cast aside, and the endorsement of *jihād*—however defined—was clearly meant to signal a deepening of the commitment of ICO member-states to the Palestinian cause. There was every indication that the PLO was pleased with the resolution and with the outcome of the summit. "If we get one-tenth of the promises," said an aide to 'Arafāt, "it will change our position in many good ways."[52]

THE SUMMIT DEFERS LESSER CAUSES

While it was not possible to exclude other items of Muslim conflicts with non-Muslims from the agenda, it was evident that most of these would divide ranks

more than unite them. Chatti wanted to ensure, above all, that the summit should restore the Palestine question to its proper top priority. While there was no intention of abandoning other issues, the ICO secretariat applied steady pressure to defer them to future discussion at Foreign Ministerial or Standing Committee level.

Afghanistan posed a special dilemma. It had been hoped to keep this issue out of the conference forum to pursue it within the countries of the standing committee; but the standing committee had already failed. The Afghanistan issue could therefore not be excluded from the summit's deliberations and the ICO was caught between member-states aligned with the Soviet Union and representatives of various Afghan guerrilla groups who demanded a hearing.

An Afghan guerrilla leader—in fact, an Azhar-educated Kabul University instructor—was allowed to address a closed session. He called upon Muslim States to sever all political and economic relations with the Soviet Union and to recognize his organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Afghan people.[53] Syria's President Ḥāfiz al-Asad presented the opposing view. He spoke of the issue as a "refugee problem," and warned that "denunciation and condemnation cannot force the withdrawal of the foreign forces, but might perhaps achieve completely the opposite."[54] The PLO's position resembled Syria's. "We demand the right of Afghanistan to be independent, non-aligned and part of the Islamic group," said the PLO spokesman, 'Abd al-Muḥsin Abū Mayzar. "But the crisis can only be solved through dialogue between Afghanistan, its neighbours, and the Soviet Union as a friend of the Islamic world."[55]

The summit organizers had no intention of letting discussion on this issue get out of hand, and Pakistan's President, Ziya al-Ḥaqq, relieved the tension by proposing that the ICO endorse the efforts of the UN to find a solution.[56] The UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, was in Tā'if as an observer, and he apparently encouraged the ICO to place its confidence in a UN-sponsored initiative. A resolution to this effect was adopted. To all intents and purposes the ICO had set aside its own diplomacy. "We are realistic people," said Sa'ūd al-Faysal. "We cannot tackle a Super Power like the USSR in the same way as we treat Israel."[57] "Of course, we consider Afghanistan important," reflected Chatti some months later, "but it does not take priority over the Palestine problem, which is the key to peace in the area and the whole world."[58]

A number of the ICO's other traditional concerns were also deferred. An Eritrean delegation pressed its case, but the issue was passed on to a new committee composed of the ICO secretariat, Senegal and Guinea. A decision on formal recognition of Eritrea as an ICO observer was deferred to a subsequent conference at Foreign Ministerial level.[59] Speaking on the Eritrean question, the Sudan's President, Ja'far al-Numayrī—who has a special interest in its solution—said: "We do not want the ICO to get involved in many problems at a time when it is facing the issues of Palestine and Jerusalem, Afghanistan and the Gulf War."[60]

The cause of the Filipino Muslims and the request of the Moro Liberation Front for ICO observer status, were also deferred.

THE SUMMIT AND INTER-MUSLIM CONFLICTS

The summit also provided an opportunity to determine which of the conflicts between member-states were within ICO jurisdiction. The outstanding one was, of course, the war between Iran and Iraq. Chatti apparently believed that a ceasefire was within reach, and held the view that the ICO's authority was at stake in this war as in no other conflict between its member-states. In Iran's absence, the summit could not provide a forum for reconciliation; but Chatti carefully used

the opportunity to prepare the ground for a new ICO initiative. One move was to shift President Saddām Ḥusayn's speech from an open to a closed session.[61] The ICO mediation committee was expanded and, in anticipation of negotiations, the summit decided to create an international Islamic Court of Justice that would settle inter-Muslim disputes—a proposal that played an important role in a subsequent ICO diplomatic initiative.[62] So, too, did a summit agreement to set up an "Islamic force" to implement a ceasefire once the warring parties had agreed to it.

Differences among Arab States were not much aired at the summit as it was considered bad form to air Arab disputes in the presence of others—a point made by Syria's Foreign Minister, 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Khaddām, whose Government was at odds with both Jordan and Iraq (see essay on inter-Arab relations):

> We should not bring out our Arab disputes to the Islamic Conference or have the conference discuss them because this will affect the unity of the Islamic stance and the morale of the Islamic States. For this reason, the Arabs must present a united front and defer their differences for discussion within an Arab arena.[63]

Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister, Sa'ūd al-Faysal concurred:

> This conference includes Arab and non-Arab countries. As you know, efforts are being made within the framework of the Arab League. I believe these efforts are blessed by the Islamic conference. However, there are no special efforts by this conference on this matter.[64]

This division of responsibility between the ICO and the Arab League was maintained thanks to Chatti's close relationship with the Arab League Secretary-General, Chedli Klibi. Chatti maintained that absolute harmony existed between the two organizations; that "Arab nationalism and Islamic nationalism are integral, and there is nothing which will have the effect of putting them in opposition over anything."[65] Chatti and Klibi had held a meeting in Jidda on 20 June 1980 to coordinate their activities and to prove, in Chatti's words, "that the two movements are complementary, and that the unity of the Arabs is an indispensable element for the achievement of the ambitions of the Islamic peoples."[66] This was re-affirmed in Klibi's address to the Tā'if summit.[67] In this manner, the jurisdiction of the ICO—whose memberships overlapped that of the Arab League—was defined to exclude inter-Arab conflicts.

Much excitement did follow the chance meeting between Algeria's President Chedli Benjedid and Morocco's King Ḥasan II at the Ka'ba. They shook hands which gave rise to speculation that Saudi mediation in their conflict over the Western Sahara might be in the offing.[68] "I believe it was divine intervention that brought about the scene that pleased all of us," affirmed Sa'ūd al-Faysal.[69] But, as it turned out, the encounter was without significance. The Western Sahara question did not find a place on the agenda (see essay on inter-Arab relations).

Libyan intervention in Chad did not figure in the agenda either, although both Niger's President Seyni Kountche and the Sudanese President Numayrī openly criticized Libya during their stay in Tā'if.[70] Niger's Foreign Minister, Daouda Diallo, in a reference to the Chadian question, plainly stated that the African States concerned with it did not "particularly want to discuss it."[71] Sa'ūd al-Faysal declared the crisis a matter for African States themselves to settle.[72] In this instance, there appeared to be a division of jurisdiction between the ICO and the Organization of African Unity, which enjoyed observer status at the conference.

FINANCIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEASURES

Just as the ICO had hoped to make the summit memorable for its political commitments to the Palestinian cause so, too, it sought to mark the summit apart by securing far-reaching financial commitments from member-states. The most important of these were made to the subsidiary organs of the ICO: the IDB, the Islamic Solidarity Fund (ISF) and the Jerusalem Fund.

The IDB was created in August 1974 at a meeting of Muslim Finance Ministers in Jidda. Its purpose was to direct aid money, through Muslim channels, from Muslim oil-producing countries to development in ICO member-states short of capital. In conformity with the *sharī'a*, the IDB did not charge borrowers interest; instead it levied service charges, or purchased equity participation in projects. The ICO initially authorized the IDB a capitalization of 2,000m Islamic dinars (IsD1 = c. $1.26), of which IsD790m was eventually subscribed by ICO member-states, led by Saudi Arabia, Libya, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait.

By late 1980, much of the initially subscribed capital had been invested in loans for infrastructural development, or was tied up in the financing of foreign trade. The IDB had even taken to accepting deposits from institutions and individuals to maintain cash reserves. The summit conference thus proved an opportunity to expand the IDB's subscribed capital to the authorized limit. With the aid of large Saudi and Arab Gulf contributions, the IDB's subscribed capital was raised to the full IsD2,000m. The expansion was no doubt anticipated by the IDB President, Aḥmad Muḥammad 'Alī, since at a meeting in December 1980 the IDB's Executive Board had set a record budget of $790m for the bank's fiscal year.[73] At the annual meeting of the IDB's trustees, held in March 1981 in Khartoum, it was announced that the additional IsD1,210m would be disbursed to the bank over five years in equal instalments.[74] The summit subscription more than doubled the resources of what was already one of the best-endowed aid institutions in Asia and Africa.

But the summit went still further. Crown Prince Fahd proposed "that States which are members of the ICO and which can afford to do so, should allocate a sum which must not be less than $3 bn to support the development programmes in the Islamic world . . . the Saudi Kingdom announces that it will contribute $1 bn to achieve this noble aim."[75] Kuwait and the UAE each immediately pledged $500m, and Qatar pledged $300m,[76] bringing the total pledge to $2,300m. The future administration of these funds was left undetermined. It was reported that the Saudis preferred to turn over the capital to a new fund or to the ICO secretariat itself, while many of the poorer countries hoped that the sum would go to the IDB.[77] A later report indicated that a rudimentary administrative framework for the monies had been set up, not at the IDB but in the ICO's Jidda headquarters and that they would be managed by officials of the Saudi, Kuwait and UAE national development funds.[78] Although it would still be some time before the new IDB and ICO funds reached beneficiaries, the promises made at the summit raised the projected capitalization of both Islamic development funds to over $5 bn.

The ISF had been created at the Lahore Islamic summit in 1974 to give outright grants to advance Muslim education, propagate Islam, finance Muslim associations, and to relieve Muslim victims of natural disasters. The funds came from voluntary contributions, most of which were Saudi in origin. The annual budget had stood at c. $15m. The summit not only called on ICO member-states to raise the annual budget to $50m, but also provided for the establishment of an ISF trust of $100m.[79] At the meeting of the ISF's permanent council in April 1981, plans for an ambitious fund-raising campaign were announced. Pressure was also brought to bear on member-states to help create a permanent endowment of $100m for the

Jerusalem Fund, which had apparently suffered from fluctuations in the annual contributions on which it subsisted. A group of African States brought the question of West African drought and famine to the attention of the summit, and a resolution was passed creating a "Committee of Islamic Solidarity with the People's of the Sahel." At a subsequent meeting of Muslim Foreign Ministers in June 1981 four States pledged $210m to promote agricultural and irrigation projects in the countries of the Sahel.[80] Pledges were also made to smaller funds and subsidiary agencies, so that the summit came to represent a windfall for the organizations that revolved around the ICO.

The summit finally settled a major constitutional question that had long been pending. Seven years had passed since the previous summit, and the decision to hold a summit every three years conformed to the general shift of ICO gatherings towards periodicity. King Ḥasan II suggested Morocco as the site for the next summit, scheduled for 1984. His offer was accepted. It was thus assured that summitry would become a regular concern of the ICO secretariat.

The organizers of the Tā'if summit congratulated themselves upon its achievements, and saw it as an important lap in the long passage of Islam from a state of division to a state of harmony. The deliberations had extracted some dramatic political and financial commitments from member-states—commitments made to each other which, under other circumstances, might have been secured only through protracted negotiation over years. The summit accelerated what was essentially a gradual and cumulative process in which conference upon conference, fund upon fund, would fashion a wider Muslim polity at the hub of international affairs. The unruffled patience of the ICO, although often the target of its critics, had been the source of enormous progress. This summit, because it did combine promises and compromises, seemed to have struck a balance between the activism and patience necessary to all successful conference diplomacy.

THE SEQUEL TO TĀ'IF

Momentum is the engine of diplomacy, and the ICO secretariat spent the rest of 1981 in intensive efforts to press for the implementation of resolutions, while summit recollections were still fresh. The secretariat and its agencies first pressed member-states to live up to their Tā'if commitments to the Palestinian cause. ICO secretariat officials were in close touch with the Arab League's Israel Boycott Bureau, and attended its meeting of April 1981 in Damascus. Through these contacts, the ICO hoped to learn the most effective techniques of enforcing boycott policies among the non-Arab ICO member-states.[81]

The Jerusalem Committee met in Fez from 23–24 April 1981. It was chaired by King Ḥasan and attended by Chatti, President Sékou Touré and President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh. The session planned an ambitious campaign to secure recognition of Palestinian rights by various governments. The Jerusalem Committee had its sights set particularly on the US, and it resolved to hold a symposium on Jerusalem in Washington similar to that held in Paris in the previous year. Other seminars were envisaged for Bonn, London and Tokyo. The Committee also resolved to make "the necessary contacts with countries which permit Jewish immigration (to Israel) and provide facilities for it across their territories in order to persuade them to stop it." A number of the Tā'if summit resolutions were vigorously reiterated, and special attention paid to the military field. The ICO was urged to establish the military bureau recommended in the Committee's pre-summit "action plan."[82] The ICO had found an energetic spokesman in King Ḥasan for its Palestine case in the wider world.

Chatti himself compromised the ICO's position on Palestine later in the year

when he fully endorsed the peace plan of Crown Prince Fahd (see essay on Arab-Israeli relations). He maintained that Fahd spoke in the name of all Muslims.[83] Asked in October 1981 whether co-existence with Israel was possible, Chatti replied that given "the establishment of a Palestinian State in the true sense of the word, guaranteeing full sovereignty within secure borders in accordance with the norms acknowledged by all the other countries," then "there are no objections to co-existence."[84] This viewpoint certainly reflected the intimate relationship of the ICO secretariat with Saudi Arabia, but it placed Chatti in the position of advocating a plan which was strongly opposed by a number of ICO member-states, and which had yet to be presented to an ICO conference for consideration.

The ICO had commited itself during the summit to pursue its mediation efforts in the conflict between Iran and Iraq; this became the second major field of post-summit activity. Chatti apparently planned to overwhelm the belligerents by bringing a very high-level Muslim delegation to Baghdad and Tehran, and almost shaming them into a settlement. The mediation committee's mission was chaired by President Sékou Touré, and included the Presidents of Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Gambia, the Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ulusu, the PLO Chairman, Yāsir 'Arafāt, and Chatti. The mission visited both capitals at the beginning of March 1981 and soon formulated a peace plan based on an early ceasefire and withdrawal; a special committee would determine the status of the Shatt al-'Arab, and until it did so, navigation of the contested waterway would be regulated by a special ICO body, supported by ICO peacekeeping units.[85] All subsequent ICO initiatives were based on this first plan, in which the ICO's task was not merely one of reconciliation but of enforcement.

The reception accorded the new mission did not differ greatly from that of previous ICO efforts. Iraqi leaders were hospitable, agreeable to a ceasefire, but immovable on the territorial issue. In Iran, Bani Sadr and his faction showed an interest in the plan, but the Raja'i faction—with the tacit support of Ayatollahs Khomeyni, Montazeri, Khalkhali and Beheshti—demanded not only a simultaneous ceasefire and Iraqi withdrawal, but the "punishment" of Saddām Ḥusayn (see chapter on Iran). Bani Sadr eventually retreated, and when the mission's declared deadline for a ceasefire passed, the ICO efforts were stalled. That elements of the ICO plan were objectionable to both sides was known to Chatti; and it seems unlikely that either party was particularly enthusiastic about the ICO's projected role in the interim period between a ceasefire and a final settlement. Since the ICO had no peacekeeping experience, a March ceasefire and Iraqi withdrawal would have been virtually unsupervised—a possibility which no doubt increased doubts about the ICO plan.

Chatti set out, more or less on his own, in late March 1981 on yet another initiative. Once again he shuttled between Baghdad and Tehran, but again with little encouragement. This particular initiative ended with a nasty personal attack upon Chatti by the Iranian Foreign Ministry after it claimed that Chatti had been condemning an Iranian attack on Iraqi airbases:

> Mr Chatti, perhaps you also believe it is necessary to intensify the rocket attacks and to exert pressure on citizens so as to drive Islamic Iran to the negotiation table so that it will forfeit its rights. Therefore, you have co-operated with our enemy in justifying the destruction of cities and the killing of non-military civilians.[86]

Chatti denied having ever given the interview or ever commenting on the actual fighting.[87] Bani Sadr announced that the Foreign Ministry statement "was issued

outside the correct, permissible procedures and, therefore, it is not valid and should not be regarded as reflecting the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran."[88]

But the Foreign Ministry statement did reflect a view of Chatti's efforts held by the most influential political faction in Iran, the rigorously fundamentalist.

In early May, Chatti, 'Arafāt and Ziaur Rahman opened a third round of talks, but with the usual results. The ICO's newest difficulty was that Bani Sadr's star was in rapid descent; when he finally went into hiding, a fourth round scheduled for late June had to be cancelled.[89] Chatti declared that the triumph of Raja'i and the clerical faction in Iran did not "pose any difficulty regarding the peace efforts."[90] But, in fact, the fall of Bani Sadr marked the end of Chatti's shuttle diplomacy. He no longer felt himself welcome in Tehran, or that there was anyone there with whom he could negotiate constructively. In October 1981 Chatti revealed that Iraq had accepted the latest version of his March 1981 plan. He also met at length with Iran's Foreign Minister in New York and indicated that if Iran were to approve the ceasefire plan, an extraordinary Islamic summit might be required in Jidda to work out how the ICO was to implement its peacekeeping role.[91]

By late 1981, few anticipated a ceasefire before the conflict had run its military course. For the ICO, the persistence of the conflict represented a blemish upon its record that could not be concealed. Chatti had conducted negotiations in an ostentatious fashion; he had set an unrealistic deadline for a ceasefire which had embarrassed those who co-operated with the first mission; and he had offered the warring parties a wide range of peacekeeping services which he was not in a position to provide. For these reasons, the ICO had not established itself as more adept at resolving this dispute between its own member-states than other mediators in the field.

Aside from these efforts to deal with specific issues, two Islamic Ministerial conferences re-affirmed the Tā'if summit resolutions. Islamic Foreign Ministers, who met in Baghdad for their regularly-scheduled annual conference from 1–4 June 1981, issued a statement which paraphrased the summit resolutions with few variations.[92] The Foreign Ministers seemed to have little new to say to one another, except for the Libyan delegation which became involved in two verbal altercations—one with the Sudanese delegation after Khartoum's resumption of relations with Egypt; and the other with the Saudi Arabian delegation over the presence of American AWACS planes in the Kingdom.[93]

Greater harmony prevailed at the regular conference of Muslim Ministers of Religious Endowments and Affairs, held in Mecca from 17–19 June 1981. It also endorsed the summit's positions at some length.[94]

Only in the Summer did the ICO secretariat's calendar thin out, closing what was without doubt its fullest year ever.

RESPONSES FROM LIBYA, EGYPT AND IRAN

Islamic States on the fringes of the ICO which had not shared in the collective expression of solidarity at Tā'if, compensated for their isolation in a variety of ways. Just before the summit, a rally of Muslims "from all parts of the Islamic world" was held in Libya. On this occasion, Qadhdhāfī attacked those who hid behind Islam to worship the Americans and Israelis, and demanded a *jihād* to liberate Jerusalem.[95]

The Egyptian response was rather more complex. The Cairo-based League of Islamic and Arab Peoples had riveted its attention in its first session on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (see above). But at its second session, convened on 30 May 1981, it adopted a new tactic. The emphasis was on Jerusalem, but to such an

exaggerated extent that the sincerity of its resolutions lacked credibility. Either the ICO summit had convinced the League organizers that without full treatment of the Jerusalem issue, their enterprise would fail in the wider Muslim world or else Cairo sought by its more emphatic approach to appraise Israel of its negotiating position on Jerusalem.[96] The former seemed the more likely. It was significant that the League Secretary-General, Sayyid Nawfal, sent the text of the League's decision on Jerusalem to King Ḥasan, Ḥabīb Chatti and Yāsir 'Arafāt, along with a letter calling on Muslims to set aside their differences.[97] This seemed to hint at an attempt to use the League not necessarily to counter the ICO, but to explore possibilities of Egypt's restoration to the ICO fold. At the same time, however, the League continued to advance an ambitious plan for the creation of institutions which duplicated those of the ICO, including a Development Bank and a Solidarity Fund.[98] (For additional details, see essay on inter-Arab relations.)

Iran's claim to Muslim primacy, advanced outside the organized framework established over the previous decade, continued to vex the ICO secretariat and Saudi Arabia more than any other rival claim. The challenges often came unexpectedly. In August 1981, the ICO's position on Jerusalem was dismissed by Iranian commentators as inadequate, and the Iranian Foreign Ministry proposed the creation of a new Islamic Front for Palestine's liberation.[99] In October 1981, Iran proposed to Libya that they create their own Islamic news agency,[100] although the ICO had already created a large organizaton for this exact purpose, the International Islamic News Agency (IINA).[101] These moves, combined with the failure of the ICO mediation committee to gain Iranian co-operation, produced the impression of Iran having virtually withdrawn from the ICO. But its position had been complicated by the fact that the busy year of ICO diplomacy had taken place in countries considered hostile by Iran: Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Morocco (ruled by a monarch dubbed "Shah Ḥasan" by the Iranian media).

The Muslim dialogue between States, whether amicable or hostile, now dominated Muslim politics. But it was not an equal contest. The ICO secretariat and core states built around themselves a more durable consensus through fairly powerful organizational tools. Their authority was not unchallenged, but none of the rivals—Libya, Egypt, or Iran—had the resources necessary to displace the ICO. Still, the ICO remained so thoroughly dependent upon Saudi Arabia that whatever the outcome of the dialogue, the ICO's propects were inseparable from those of the Saudi State.

BEYOND DIPLOMACY

Beyond the circle of high policy and diplomacy lay an expanse of Muslim activism which often crossed national and linguistic borders. Varied and often covert, much of this activity eluded attention or even detection. Several notable instances in which regimes allegedly assisted Muslim opposition movements within other States came to light. Iraq charged Iran with fomenting Shī'ī unrest, and Iran actually claimed to be doing so; but evidence of a sophisticated apparatus for exporting Iran's revolution was thin (see chapters on Iraq and Iran). Syria charged Jordan with aiding the Muslim Brotherhood in its territory, a charge not without foundation, but again couched in exaggerated terms (see essay on inter-Arab relations). Libya was charged with similar activity in parts of Africa (see chapters on Libya and Sudan).

It was easier to assess the overt attempts by some regimes to influence Muslims beyond their own borders. Libya maintained an organization known as the Islamic Call Society, founded in 1970 and responsible for a wide range of missionary activities not unrelated to Libyan policy aims. The Society was under the

direction of Aḥmad al-Sharīf, "whose reputation," as one sympathetic account related, "extends beyond the frontiers of Libya." The purpose of this society, according to the same source, was "to free their co-religionists and the peoples of Africa and Asia from the traditional colonialism and the neo-colonialism in which they are entrapped, thereby refuting the propaganda, prejudices and allegations indulged in by opponents of Islam and enemies of mankind."[102]

Saudi Arabia employed many channels for the diffusion of its own particular ideas, but the most prominent remained the Mecca-based MWL, established in 1962. The League's Secretary-General and former *qādī* of Jidda, Shaykh Muḥammad 'Alī al-Ḥarakān, was a fixture at all meetings of open Muslim associations beyond Saudi Arabia. The League disposed of a sizeable budget, provided by the Saudi Government for the support of centres, associations, and projects. The Constituent Council of the League—which assembles like-minded thinkers and activists from around the Muslim world—held its 22nd and 23rd regular sessions in October 1980 and September 1981 respectively. Their resolutions expressed unreserved solidarity with Muslim movements which the Saudi Foreign Ministry was reluctant to support publicly.[103]

Egypt, lacking the means of Libya and Saudi Arabia, continued to disseminate its views abroad through small Muslim missions to other countries. A highlight was a visit by the rector of al-Azhar, Shaykh 'Abd al-Raḥmān Baysār, to Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia. He claimed to have re-established al-Azhar's ties with important religious institutions.[104] But much of the personal diplomacy—once the preserve of the rector—had been taken up by Sayyid Nawfal, Secretary-General of the League of Islamic and Arab Peoples, and Zakariya al-Barrī, Minister of Religious Affairs and Endowments. Both travelled extensively in Europe and Africa.

No Iranian Ministry had yet organized itself for the systematic diffusion of funds and missions to the wider Muslim world. Published materials in Turkish, Arabic and Urdu continued to emanate from Tehran; but informal connections were the mainstay of Iran's information effort among Muslims abroad. Much of what appeared to be pro-Iranian activity in the ME, Europe and America, must have been of spontaneous inspiration.

Another issue to be explored is whether Muslim opposition movements maintain ties with one another, independent of any governmental involvement. The answer must certainly be in the affirmative, although the extent and significance of those ties remain unknown. Several major figures in Muslim opposition movements live in exile in Europe, where they are free to publish and speak, and where they are known to mingle at mosques, conferences and rallies.

The only evidence of organized oppositional activity came in mid-December 1981 when it was reported that Muslims representing Afghan guerrilla groups, the Filipino Moro Liberation Front, the Higher Command of the Islamic Revolution in Syria, the Tunisian Islamic Tendency movement as well as Egyptian, Iraqi and Sudanese groups, flew into London for a three-day weekend meeting. The unidentified participants requested confidentiality, but confirmed that many of them had already met on the continent.[105] The significance of this gathering was not immediately clear.

Martin Kramer

APPENDIX I: MECCA DECLARATION OF THIRD ISLAMIC SUMMIT

Issued in Tā'if on 28 January 1981, as broadcast by Radio Riyadh on 28 January 1981

We, the Kings, Presidents and Amirs of States and Governments, members of the ICO, while meeting at the third Islamic summit held at holy Mecca from 25–28 January 1981, thank Almighty God for bestowing His grace on this meeting in the holy city and in the shadow of the blessed Ka'ba, the cradle of the revelation and the *qibla* of Muslims at the beginning of the new Hegira century, a meeting which we consider to be a solemn event in the history of the Islamic nation and one which we regard as a decisive starting point for an all-embracing Islamic awakening which requires all Muslims to pause and review their past record and their current reality and look forward with a firm will to a better future in the shadow of the policy of Islamic solidarity, in order to restore the unity of their ranks, work for their prosperity and advancement, and achieve, once again, an exalted position in the world community and human civilization.

The strict adherence of Muslims to Islam and its principles and values as a way of life is their shield which protects them against the imminent dangers and is their ideal way toward achieving invulnerability, dignity and prosperity and their straight course to building the future, and their guarantee which safeguards the nation's noble character and which protects it from the sweeping tyranny of materialism and which provides it with a powerful incentive which drives those who are in charge of its affairs and its sons to rise to liberate its holy shrines and to recover its rights and its place so that it can join the nations of the world in realizing equality, peace and plenty for all mankind.

The belief of all Muslims in the immortal teachings manifested in freedom, justice and the dignity of man and standing up to injustice and aggression, and their belief in tolerance, compassion and fraternity calls on us to make a resolution to establish a just peace and amity between peoples, to guarantee the rights of man and to continue to support the international organizations which are based on human principles and peaceful coexistence between peoples so that a new era may begin in which relations between nations are governed by principles and not force, free from all forms of persecution, exploitation, domination, injustice, colonialism in both its old and new forms and in which all forms of discrimination on the basis of race, colour, or creed are ended.

We reaffirm that adherence to the faith and opposition to apostasy fortify our societies against weakness and feebleness in the effectiveness of our civilization, and enable these societies to avoid what befell them in the past—disunity and subjugation, the fact that placed many Muslim countries under foreign control, including Jerusalem, the first of the two *qibla*s and the third holiest place, and subsequently made them endure various forms of injustice and aggression. This led to the diminishing of these countries' scientific gains and their share of their own material resources; they remained until the beginning of this century a target, with their independence, security, honour and dignity being endangered and challenged.

We note with profound regret the position in which at present mankind finds itself, despite the material progress and the vast scientific and technical gains made—suffering spiritual poverty, weakness of faith and lack of morals, so much so that injustice spreads in society, crises worsen in economic situations, and instability follows instability in the international political structure. The forces of evil have become stronger and the seats of war and sedition have become many, threatening the tranquillity of man and the security of the world and the safety of human civilization. We appreciate that our Islamic nation possesses genuine factors for establishing unity and solidarity, and for realizing progress, dignity and prosperity due to the Book of God it possesses and the example of God's messenger it follows, as the Book and the example set a comprehensive guideline of life guiding it toward right, good and salvation, connecting the nation with its heritage of civilization, creating for it the means for liberating itself from subjugation and destruction, mobilizing it in the means of spiritual strength, and enabling it to utilize all its energies, and thus to be this nation's guide on the right path.

We also appreciate that our nation, which is made strong by such spiritual energies, has material and human means consisting of about 1 bn people of various types spread over a vast area of countries and having vast natural resources, and that the good use of these means can allow this nation to occupy a prominent place in this world and guarantee for it prosperity and can be a factor of good and stability for the benefit of all mankind.

For all this, we, at this conference, and in this country, and on this decisive day in the history of Islam, are resolved to strengthen the bonds of solidarity among ourselves and seize the opportunities of this awakening, and for this we declare the following:

Out of our belief that Muslims, despite the differences in language, colour, countries and situation, are one nation, holding on to the bond of Islam and inspired in their life by a course on which they do not differ, and derive their ideological source from a common heritage of civilization, and shoulder one mission in this world and are thus a nation which rejects bias toward any bloc or any ideological tendency and which refuses to be divided by whims and interests, we are determined to move forward in order to strengthen the ties of solidarity between our peoples and states, to transcend all that is likely to lead to division and dissension, and to amicably settle any conflict that might arise among us, seeking the arbitration of covenants and the principles of fraternity, community and linkage, and the standards of justice and tolerance in which we all believe, and which we derive from the Book of God and the tradition set by His Prophet, regarding them as a permanent resort in any arbitration.

In accordance with the aspirations of our peoples, we are determined to intensify consultation between us concerning international matters so that our moves on the international scene become complementary,and so that our positions at the international organizations are co-ordinated in a search for more effectiveness of our common efforts, and in order to make clearer the orientations of our nation, and to defend its causes, rights and interests, and to enhance its place and prestige in the world.

We are determined to wage a *jihād* by all the means at our disposal in order to liberate our occupied territories, to help one another in the defence of our independence and territorial integrity, to defend our rights and remove the injustices besetting us, relying on God and on our own strength and on our firm solidarity.

Conscious that Muslims are, in the world of today, being subjected to many injustices and surrounded by various threats due to the reign of force and aggression, and to an intensification of the use of violence in international relations;and knowing that Islam permits to those who believe in it and to others only right and justice, and offers to those who do not fight us in our religion, who do not drive us out from our homes and do not violate our sanctities only tolerance and magnanimity; and as Islam does not believe in complacence toward the unrighteous and in acceptance of injustice and oppression, we reaffirm in the face of Zionist aggression that has usurped the land of Palestine and the other occupied territories our determination to counter this aggression, its schemes and practices with a comprehensive resistance. We also reject and denounce the policies which make this aggression possible and which extend to it political and economic aid, manpower and military aid.

We also reject any initiative that does not adopt the Palestinian option, which consists in a just settlement to the Palestinian question based on the re-establishment of the unquestionable national rights of the Palestinian people, including its right to return to self-determination and to set up an independent Palestinian state on its national territory, under the leadership of the PLO, its sole legitimate representative.

We also reject any attempt to put pressure on us or on any other state of the world in order to accept a *fait accompli* and a capitulation to unjust solutions.

We assert our determination to confront aggression and pressures by all means and to make preparations for a *jihād* for the liberation of the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and the sanctities and for the restoration of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people which have been asserted by international law and by the UN resolutions connected with the question of Palestine.

We consider the provocations committed against the al-Aqsā mosque in Jerusalem and the transgressions on the Islamic and Christian sanctities in occupied Palestine and on the religious and inalienable national rights of the people of Palestine and the continuation of transgression represented in the decisions to annex Jerusalem and to usurp it from its lawful owners as grave reasons that prompt us to adopt a firm stand to reject this transgression and to condemn those who support it and to stand in the face of everyone who condones it or recognizes it.

Therefore we pledge a *jihād* with the means we possess for the liberation of Jerusalem and to make this liberation the principal Islamic issue, the responsibility of this generation of our nation so that, with God's help, Jerusalem will be liberated together with the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and returned to their lawful owners.

With regard to what has been committed in the land of Afghanistan—flagrant invasion of a sovereign Islamic state and violation of the right of the Afghan people to freedom and self-determination and to preserve their Islamic identity—we are determined to continue backing the people of Afghanistan in their struggle. We are still concerned about the situation in Afghanistan arising from the foreign armed intervention. We again affirm the determination to endeavour to find a political solution to this crisis based on the immediate and total withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan and respect for the political independence and territorial integrity and the non-aligned nature of Afghanistan, as well as the respect of the inalienable rights of the heroic Afghan people to self-determination without any foreign interference or any pressure. We declare our full solidarity with the Afghan people who are striving for their freedom and independence.

We express our profound concern over the growing rivalry between the two Super Powers for spheres of influence and their increased attempts to firmly establish their military presence in the Arab regions which are adjacent to the states of the Islamic world, such as the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea and the Gulf.

We confirm our joint conviction that peace and stability in the Gulf, and the security of its maritime routes, are the absolute responsibility of the Gulf States without foreign interference.

Taking into consideration the oppression of minorities and Muslim groups in many parts of the world, we declare such behaviour to be a violation of human rights and an impairment of man's dignity and we call on all states with Muslim minorities to enable them to practice their religious rites in complete freedom and to enjoy their equal rights on the basis of citizenship and the sanctity of law.

In view of the spread in international relations of the evils of racism and fanaticism and the dominant nature of them of the logic of force and the arms race, the greed and economic injustice prevailing in them, and the manifestations of colonialism and subordination of weak peoples—a matter which threatens to cause the collapse of the world's civilization and the disturbance of its social and material balance—and out of the hope that the forces of good in the whole world will co-operate so that humanitarian values calling for fraternity, justice and peace, as approved by the principles of Islam and consolidated by its historical traditions, will prevail, we call on all countries and peoples to build a world based on truthful intentions and joint efforts so that peace may prevail and conflict and war will disappear, when disputes will be settled in an amicable manner when possible and relations will be conducted in a constructive and useful manner; so as to dedicate the energies of mankind to advancing the life of man and not to be wasted in the arms race and by the means of death and destruction; so that justice prevails and relations among peoples will be based on equality, fraternity, freedom and mercy, rather than on discrimination and violence; so that the oppressed peoples will be liberated and be free of the evils of sedition kindled by those supporting war; and so that mankind will be blessed with peace and basic humanitarian rights be secured.

We also confirm our eagerness, and call on others, to work for the consolidation of the UN and the other international institutions which form suitable forums for co-operation among mankind and important rostrums for dialogue and understanding and satisfactory means for settling disputes and dealing with crises.

We express a strong denunciation of all trends that seek to impose trusteeship on the UN and to impede its activity. We condemn Israel and the countries which have been violating the principles of the UN Charter and disregarding the unanimous will of mankind which the organization represents.

We stress our loyalty to the principles and aims of the Non-aligned movement and also our concern to support the Arab League and the OAU, and also our full solidarity with the countries of the Third World.

Out of our belief in the need of our peoples to adhere to their religion and to rely on their heritage in the building of a society which is committed to faith, justice and ethics, we stress our intention to be guided by the Book of God and the tradition of His Prophet in the system of life in our communities and in consolidating relations among ourselves and with the countries and peoples of the world in the belief that this effort is the best guarantee to make the word of right and virtue rise above anything else and to establish justice and peace—the best way toward the prosperity, security and dignity of the peoples of the Muslim nation.

Out of our concern to spread consultation among Muslims and to foster Islamic principles in the life of our nation so that virtue may prevail, vice may be shunned and unity in the general will of citizens may be the guiding motto, and so that they may participate in the conduct of their affairs free from the causes of weakness and discord, we shall, to achieve this, try to facilitate contact between our peoples and their specialized organizations and provide an opportunity for a continued exchange of advice.

We also affirm our concern to uphold the rights of man and his dignity, inspired by the Book of God and the traditions of His Prophet, being a fundamental point of reference for the safeguard of the rights of mankind and their interests. We also stress our resolve to ensure the inviolability of man, his freedom and his basic needs. Toward this end we shall try to establish the basis and means for safeguarding rights and sanctities, warding off injustices and supporting all peoples struggling for freedom, independence and justice, and also supporting the principles of justice and dignity in the world and wherever they are exposed to persecution, including Palestine and South Africa.

Out of our realization of our common interests, we declare our determination to work to put an end to poverty which is still being experienced by some of our people, through consolidating our economic co-operation on the basis of the integration of our capabilities so as to promote the co-ordinated development of our countries. We also, in accordance with the spirit of Islamic solidarity, declare our intention to promote the Islamic awakening of the less developed countries among us. We also declare our determination to guide our development policies so as to strike a balance in them between spiritual and material progress.

We call for the establishment of economic relations in the world based on the principles of justice and equality and the harmony of interests so that the wide difference between industrial states and developing and poor countries will disappear, and so that what will prevail will be an economic order based on justice and solidarity, in which development policies are rationalized and integrated, which will finally eliminate hunger and its dangers and the forms of deprivation and all the forms of exploitation of peoples who suffer from the traces of colonialism and backwardness, achieving for them the development of their resources and the best benefit from them.

We confirm anew the right to sovereignty of peoples over their natural resources and their right to control their exploitation. Out of our belief in the provisions of the principles of Islam—that the seeking of knowledge is a duty of every Muslim—we declare the intention to co-operate with the aim of expanding the spreading of knowledge and consolidating its institutions so that ignorance and illiteracy will be eliminated, and also to work for the consolidation of an Islamic curriculum in education and the encouragement of research and interpretation [*ijtihād*] among the '*ulamā*' of the Muslims and their thinkers, while also expanding in sciences and modern technology.

We also pledge to co-ordinate our efforts in the field of education and culture so that we derive from the sources of our religion and the course of our heritage what unites the nation and consolidates its culture and solidarity, and rid our societies of the manifestation of decay and deviation, and purify them with the most noble morals and fortify the soul against ignorance and against principles hostile to Islam, and safeguard our nation from the campaigns based on the exploitation of the material needs of some Muslims to separate them from their religion.

Out of the belief in the need to spread the principles of Islam and its cultural brillance in Islamic societies and in the world by showing the spiritual powers and moral meanings in its principles and laws which encourage progress, good and prosperity, we are determined to co-operate in making available the human and material means for the achievement of these objectives.

We also pledge to make further efforts in all the cultural fields in order to achieve a *rapprochement* of thoughts among Muslims and to cleanse Islamic thought of all that is alien or divisive.

We also pledge, within the context of exchange and common plans, to develop our information media and institutions, adhering to the guidance and teachings of Islam in a way that secures for them an effective influence in the reforming of society and in a way that contributes to the establishment of an international information order characterized by justice, impartiality and morals, so that our nation will be able to give prominence to its true qualities and reply to the systematic media campaigns aimed at besieging our peoples and isolating, misleading, slandering and defaming our nation.

While we recall with satisfaction the setting up of the ICO and quietly watch its continuous development and the strengthening of its place on the international scene—a symbol for the bringing together of the ranks of Muslims and a framework for understanding and closeness between them—and while we also see the creation of establishments stemming from the organization and the coming together of joint efforts toward this end, we pledge to strengthen and develop our organization to enable it to have the service of useful, competent people and to have enough resources in order to be able to assume the noble tasks allotted to it. We also pledge to support the ISF, the Palestine Fund, and various establishments and projects of the organization in order to enable it to assume its duties.

We bear in mind to care for and support various international and state Islamic bodies and establishments which share the objective of our organization in order to strengthen the ties of fraternity between Muslims, to intensify their solidarity in various matters and to emphasize their role in the world.

We also bear in mind to care for and support popular Islamic establishments and bodies which serve the objectives and principles of the charter of the Organization in such a way as not to come into contradiction with the laws and rules of the member-states.

We urge our peoples to seek protection in the principles of their religion and its civilization's values and to unify all their forces in confronting the challenges which surround them, and to help each other in order to better themselves and assume their mission in order to achieve honour, dignity and prosperity.

We urge all states and peoples to share with the Islamic nation, states and peoples, the peaceful and sincere feelings of human fraternity without hatred, injustice or tyranny in order to build together a world useful to man and to raise the level of our spiritual and material life.

We pray to our God to guide us, to make our efforts successful and to bestow good on our life.

"God promises those of you who believe and do righteous deeds that he will surely make them successors in the land, even as he made those before them successors, and that he will surely establish their religion for them that he has approved for them, and will give them in exchange, after their fear, security; they shall worship me, not associating anything with me. Those who disbelieve after that, they are the ungodly" (from the Qur'ān).

APPENDIX II: RESOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THIRD ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Issued in Tā'if on 28 January 1981, as broadcast by Radio Riyadh on 29 January 1981

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. At the invitation of HM King Khālid Ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz, Monarch of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and in accordance with the decision taken at the tenth Islamic conference held in Fez, Morocco, between 10 and 14 Jumādā al-Thānī 1399 AH, corresponding to 8–12 May 1979 AD the third Islamic summit conference was held in Holy Mecca in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia between 19 and 22 Rabī' al-Awwal 1401 AH, corresponding to 25–28 January 1981 AD, under the title: the Palestine and Holy Jerusalem session.

The conference was attended by Kings, Presidents and Amirs of the following Islamic States: the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria; the State of Bahrain; the Republic of Bangladesh; the United Republic of Cameroon; the Republic of Jibuti; the State of the United Arab Emirates; the Republic of Gabon; the Republic of Gambia; the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea; the Republic of Guinea-Bissau; the Republic of Upper Volta; the Federal and Islamic Republic of the Comoros; the Republic of Indonesia; the Republic of Iraq; the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; the State of Kuwait; the Republic of Lebanon; Malaysia; the Maldives; the Republic of Mali; the Islamic Republic of Mauritania; the Kingdom of Morocco; the Republic of Niger; the Sultanate of Oman; the Republic of of Uganda; the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; the State of Qatar; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Palestine; the Republic of Senegal; the Democratic Republic of Sudan; the Syrian Arab Republic; the Republic of Chad; the Democratic Republic of Somalia; the Republic of Tunisia; the Republic of Turkey; the Yemeni Arab Republic; the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Those who were absent from the conference are: the Islamic Republic of Iran; the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamāhīriyya.

Those who followed the work of the conference as observers were the following states, organizations and institutions: the State of Nigeria; the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus; the Muslim World League; the United Nations Organization; the Arab League; the Organization of African Unity; UNESCO; the Islamic Development Bank; the World Islamic Congress; the President of the Permanent Council of the Islamic Solidarity Fund; the World Symposium for Muslim Youth; the International Islamic News Agency; the Broadcasting Organization of the Islamic States; the Islamic Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Exchange of Goods; the International Union of Islamic Banks; the World Federation of Arab International Islamic Schools; the Organization of Islamic Capitals; the European Islamic Council; the UN High Commission for Refugees; the Arab Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization; the Moro Liberation Front; the Afghan *mujāhidīn* movement; the Christian Eastern Orthodox delegation.

This session was convened in the Great Mosque, close to the holy Ka'ba, at the beginning of the 15th century AH and during the month that witnessed the birth of Muḥammad the Prophet, the Messenger of God, in an atmosphere reflecting the sacred beauty of this place and the greatness of the special historic occasion, conferring on its opening session in the Great Mosque awe and prestige, making the leaders of the Islamic nation feel the greatness of their position when in the sacred Ka'ba where they stood in one rank to pray, imploring God Almighty to help them shoulder the heavy responsibilities placed on them in a world full of problems and challenges, to lead them to the path of solidarity, accord and guidance and to help them discard causes of division and discord so that the Islamic nation could return through His guidance and His success—as God has willed it to be in the Holy Book—the best of peoples evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong.

In his two opening speeches, HM King Khālid Ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz pointed to the awakening which distinguished this Muslim nation at the beginning of this century; the awakening which is void of enmity and disagreement, heralding a new society that ensures for the Muslim his aspirations for honour and dignity and that realized for mankind the hope, peace and progress to which it aspires.

The conference then met at the conference palace in Tā'if where it heard speeches by the heads of delegations and the representatives of international organizations; it also heard a detailed statement from the UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, in which he dealt with various issues which are preoccupying mankind and also the role the Muslim countries can play in tackling these issues. All the delegations praised the generous hospitality and the splendid arrangements offered by the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in convening this conference.

After the heads of delegations and guests completed delivering their statements to the conference, closed sessions

were held on Tuesday and Wednesday, 21 and 22 Rabi' al-Awwal 1401 AH, corresponding to 27 and 28 January 1981 AD. At these sessions topics on the agenda were deliberated on and the resolutions submitted by the conference of the Foreign Ministers which paved the way for the meeting of the summit were endorsed.

The conference approved the following: (i) the agenda submitted to it; (ii) the general report submitted by the preparatory conference of the Islamic States' Foreign Ministers; (iii) the Mecca Declaration. The conference also approved the following resolutions.

1. Holy Jerusalem

The conference committed itself to the liberation of Arab Jerusalem so that it would be the capital of the Palestinian State and called on all the states of the world to respect the UN resolutions not to have dealings with the Israeli occupation authorities which would give the authorities an excuse to say that such dealings were an implied recognition or an acceptance of the *fait accompli* which they had imposed by declaring Jerusalem a united capital of the Zionist entity.

The conference decided to mobilize all the economic and natural resources of the Islamic countries so as to weaken the Israeli economy and halt the financial, economic and political backing which Israel is obtaining, and to work to change international political attitudes in favour of the Palestinian people and the PLO.

2. The Questions of Palestine and the Middle East

The conference decided to consider the Palestine cause as the core of the ME problem and the number one issue of the Islamic nation. It reaffirms the commitment to the liberation of all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and the non-acceptance of any situation that would encroach on the Arab sovereignty over the holy city of Jerusalem and not to allow any Arab or Islamic side to resort unilaterally to solving the Palestinian question and the issues of the occupied Arab territories.

It stressed that just peace in the ME region cannot possibly be established except on the basis of Israel's total and unconditional withdrawal from all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and the restoration of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to return and to self-determination and the establishment of their independent state on the land of Palestine under the leadership of the PLO.

It decided to continue resisting the Camp David agreement and to consider Security Council Resolution 242 as being inconsistent with the Palestinian and the Arab rights and that it does not form a suitable basis for solving the ME crisis and the question of Palestine.

It decided that the Islamic States should use all their military, political and economic potential and their natural resources, including oil, as an effective means to back the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation and in order to confront the states which back the Zionist entity militarily, economically and politically. It called on the EEC States to execute their understandings of not putting their economic bilateral and collective agreements with Israel into effect in the occupied Palestinian Arab territories.

3. The Situation in Afghanistan

The conference expressed its strong concern over the continuation of the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan and it called once again for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan. It also expressed its extreme concern about the conditions of Afghan refugees and urged the provision of assistance to them and achieving the appropriate conditions for their return to their home.

It called for increased efforts so that Afghanistan would remain a Non-aligned independent Islamic State. It confirmed the undertaking by the ICO to continue the efforts to solve this question. It recommended the ministerial committee comprising the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference and the Foreign Ministers of Guinea, Iran, Pakistan and Tunisia to co-operate with the UN Secretary-General and his special envoy in their endeavours to find a just solution to the situation in Afghanistan.

4. Islamic Solidarity

The conference stressed the importance of coexistence among the member Islamic States based on justice, equality, mutual respect and the commitment to non-interference in internal affairs. It urged the co-ordination of efforts and solidarity to achieve independence for all people and protect their full sovereignty and lawful interests. It urged all the member-states to consolidate Islamic solidarity in a manner based on the teaching of Islam in upholding the causes of freedom, equality, progress and peace; and to encourage research studies and seminars held from a scientific aspect. It asked the Secretary-General of the Organization to render the necessary assistance and facilities to the member-states to achieve these aims through the organization and its subsidiary organs.

It urged the member-states to increase their co-operation in the economic, trade and technical fields in the interest of Islamic solidarity.

It appealed to the member-states to abstain from taking part in military alliances which exist within the framework of the conflict between the Major Powers and to reject the establishment of foreign military bases on their territories.

The conference decided to adhere strictly to the principles of non-interference directly or indirectly in internal affairs and to refrain from fomenting dissension and discord, matters that are incompatible with the rules of Islam on which the ICO is founded. It also decided to make efforts to eliminate intellectual and doctrinal differences which may arise between members by stressing the fundamental spiritual, moral and social values that unite all Muslims, and dangers which contradict the substance of Islam.

5. Holy *Jihād*

The Kings, Princes and Heads of the Islamic States have agreed on holy *jihād* to deliver Holy Jerusalem, support the

Palestine people and achieve withdrawal from the occupied Arab territory. The Islamic States would like to stress in this resolution that *jihād* has an Islamic meaning which is not open to interpretation or misunderstanding. The practical measures for its implementation should be taken in accordance with this and by continued consultation between the Islamic States.

6. The Dispute between Iran and Iraq

The conference expressed its deep concern at the continued fighting between the two Islamic States of Iran and Iraq. On the basis of the resolution taken at the conference of the Islamic Foreign Ministers held in New York on 26 September 1980 concerning the formation of the good offices committee, the conference decided to call on Iran and Iraq to agree to Islamic mediation and to facilitate the task of the good offices committee in which membership has been expanded so as to include the Secretary-General of the ICO, Senegal, Gambia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, Guinea and the PLO. The conference called on the two states to observe an immediate ceasefire and announced that the member states of the conference have agreed to set up an Islamic force to implement the ceasefire, if necessary, and in accordance with a recommendation from the good offices committee.

7. Sahel Problem

The conference stressed the need for contributions to the Sahel countries which have suffered as a result of the drought, contributions inspired by the concept of Islamic solidarity. It agreed to the programme, prepared by the joint committee of the states which are fighting the drought, covering the urgent aid needed to solve the famine problem. It was decided to form a specialized committee on a ministerial level to be called the Committee of Islamic Solidarity with the Peoples of the Sahel. It will be charged with following up the implementation of measures and taking initiatives. It is to be headed by a head of an Islamic state or government and will have as members the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference and the Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Malaysia, Palestine, the UAE, and Kuwait. It is to be joined by a representative from the joint committee of the states affected by the drought.

8. Mayotte Island

The conference reaffirms its support for the Government of the Comoros and its people in the struggle for the return of Mayotte to the territory of the Comoro Islands. It calls on France to resume the work which was started to find a just solution consistent with the resolutions of the ICO with regard to the Island of Mayotte.

9. Eritrea

The conference calls for a just and peaceful settlement to be found for the Eritrean question and supports every effort to attain that. It also calls for the formation of a committee consisting of Senegal, Guinea and the Secretariat General of the ICO to make the necessary contacts and to follow up the peaceful efforts and submit the results to the next Islamic conference of Foreign Ministers.

10. Islamic Court of Justice

The conference has agreed to set up an Islamic Court of Justice and has called for a meeting of experts from member-states to draft a statute for the Court. The Secretary-General has been asked to make the necessary arrangements for holding the meeting of experts and to submit the results to the next meeting of the Islamic Foreign Ministers.

11. The Oppressed People in the Horn of Africa

The conference expresses full support for the oppressed Muslim inhabitants in the Horn of Africa and calls for joint efforts to be made by the parties to the conflict to attain a just solution. It calls for the complete and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Horn of Africa and appeals to all member-states to offer, in the spirit of Islamic solidarity, financial and material help to the inhabitants concerned, in particular to the refugees.

Constitutional Issues

With regard to consitutional issues, the conference approved that: Islamic summit meetings shall be held periodically, every three years; the Secretary-General's term of offiice is four years and is not renewable; the post of an assistant secretary-general for Holy Jerusalem and the Palestine issue shall be established; the question of reviewing the Charter will be left to the next conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers, as will the matter of extending the term of office of assistant secretaries-general.

The conference also approved the following recommendations:

- The document on human rights in Islam shall be referred to a committee to be formed from all member-states who shall be summoned by the Secretariat General to study this document and to put before the conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers its findings.
- The Secretariat General will be entrusted with the task of arranging with the Jerusalem Committee the continuation of the preparation of the Jerusalem Document by the experts' committee, receiving the observations of the members of the Jerusalem Committee within three months from the date of receiving the document and publishing and distributing the document in the conference's three languages so that it is received by all sectors of world public opinion.
- The Islamic Conference's information plan will be referred to a commission of information experts comprising all member-states, in addition to the broadcasting stations of various Muslim countries and IINA, and also making use of the results of the Jakarta Islamic information conference. The commission will meet at the invitation of the

Secretary-General and its meeting will be held irrespective of the number attending. The outcome of the commission's work will be presented to member countries for their remarks and for modification of the plans by the Secretariat General on the basis of these remarks. The results will then be presented to the coming Islamic Foreign Ministers' conference.

- Looking into Eritrea's request to be accepted as observer member in the ICO shall be postponed until the coming session of the Muslim Foreign Ministers' conference when the outcome of the Eritrea committee, which has been formed in accordance with the Eritrea resolution, is reviewed.
- The conference underlines its previous resolution regarding the issue of the Philippines Muslims, the resolution that was adopted at the 11th Islamic conference in Islamabad. The task of drafting a resolution on the issue shall be left to the four-man committee, to be put before the coming Muslim Foreign Ministers' conference.
- The Secretariat General shall submit the final specifications and colours for changing of the flag of the Islamic Conference Organization; to be approved by the coming Muslim Foreign Ministers' conference.
- The conference noted with concern that the developing countries' problems have become aggravated as a result of the current crises in international economic relations, a matter that widens the gap between the developing and advanced countries. The conference is of the opinion that economic co-operation between the member countries in particular represents a useful means for bolstering their unity in striving to realize the new international economic system. The conference has approved the plan of action for furthering economic co-operation between member countries and has asked the Secretariat General of the ICO to speed up the adoption of appropriate measures for implementing this plan.
- The conference has decided: (a) to set up a body belonging to the ICO to be called the Islamic Centre for the Development of Trade; its headquarters shall be in Tangier, the Kingdom of Morocco; (b) to approve the statute and budget for the financial year 1981–82 of the Centre; (c) to call on the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco to take all necessary measures for the function of the Centre; (d) to direct the Secretariat General to render every possible assistance to the Moroccan Government and to work and closely co-operate with it for the establishment of the Centre; (e) member-countries are called on to render all necessary assistance to the Centre in order for it to be able to realize its aims and objectives.
- Realizing that the signing of an agreement on the promotion, protection and guaranteeing of investments in member-countries will ensure the best use of the economic potential that exists in the member-countries, that it will lead to their development and allow the transfer of capital between the member-countries and enable the peoples of the latter to realize economic progress and prosperity; and that it will eliminate all obstacles hindering the transfer of capital between the member-countries and make it possible to expand the various sectors and their capabilities regarding investment, the conference decided:

  To urge member countries to provide the Secretariat General of the ICO with their observations on the draft agreement.

  To authorize the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference Organization to hold a meeting, at a very high level, for representatives of the member countries prior to the 12th Islamic Foreign Ministers' meeting to formulate the final draft of the agreement so that it can be submitted for approval by the conference or by the competent Ministers at a meeting to be held for this purpose.
- The conference discussed the project for the establishment of an Islamic Federation of Maritime Transporters in Jidda in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and has agreed to begin the implementation of this project and has approved the statute of the Federation. It has asked the Secretariat General to work and co-operate closely with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the realization of this project. It has called on member countries to join the Federation and co-operate with it in order to enable it to realize its aims.
- The conference has decided to request the IDB to grant urgent and increased assistance to the less developed member-countries, including the funding of trade with more flexible and easier terms. The conference decided to subscribe IsD1,210m representing the non-subscribed share of the permitted capital of IsD2,000m.
- The conference decided to ask the Secretary-General to provide studies connected with the financial and administrative position of the Secretariat General to the permanent financial committee of the organization so that after examination it can present proposals to the 12th session of the Foreign Ministers who are to take the appropriate decisions. Concerning the provision of the capital of the Islamic Solidarity and Jerusalem Funds, it was decided to refer the question to the meeting of the Finance Ministers of the Islamic States which is to notify the Secretariat General of the donations of the states which are to make voluntary contributions in the cultural and social fields.
- The conference decided to ask all member-states to raise the annual budget of the ISF to not less than $50m. to make and increase contributions and to announce them and to provide supplementary revenue from such things as postal stamps and to organize annual campaigns for the collection of donations in each state. The conference also decided to confirm the establishment of a trust for the benefit of the Fund with a capital of $100m. Member-states are called upon to cover this amount voluntarily.
- The conference has called for further studies on the establishment of an Islamic relief agency and in the meantime the ISF will undertake what is required and draw expenses from the section relating to disasters. It also has called on member-states to contribute towards the re-building of the Algerian town of al-Asnam. The conference expressed sympathy with the Government and people of Algeria and appealed to member-states to contribute to the reconstruction of al-Asnam. It called on the Secretary-General to circulate plans for the rebuilding and to submit a report on the matter to the 12th conference of the Foreign Ministers.
- The conference decided to commit the ICO to the completion of Islamic centres in Guinea-Bissau and Timbuktu and the Islamic universities in Niger and Uganda and to allow the ISF to continue its efforts for this purpose. It called on

member-states to give direct help for the completion of the project. It also stressed the commitment of the ICO to the establishment of the Uganda university and to ask the ISF to follow up the matter. It also called on the Niger Government to begin the setting up of an Islamic university.

- The conference decided to call on all member-states to contribute towards the capital required for the Islamic Institute of Science and Technology which is estimated at $50m for the first stage. It asks the Secretariat General to use all necessary measures for the establishment of the institute and to explain its objectives to member-states, urging them to provide material and moral support.
- The conference decided to urge member-states to establish and support the Islamic Organization for Education, Science and Culture and to take the necessary measures for its establishment. It called on member-states to declare their accession to the organization so that a founding conference may be held in the state which is to be the headquarters of the Organization.
- The conference decided to confirm the content of the resolution issued in connection with an Islamic solidarity sports tournament by the 11th conference of the Foreign Ministers and called on member-states to co-operate in organizing this tournament at regular periods. It called on the Secretary-General to circulate the draft statutes of the Islamic Sports Union to member-states for their views and observations. It welcomed the invitation by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to host the second tournament in 1982 and it called on member-states to participate.
- The conference decided at the conclusion of its meetings that the 12th session of the Islamic Foreign Ministers shall be held in Baghdad in the second half of May 1981. It also decided to hold the session of the office of the third summit of the Islamic States every now and then to follow up developments in the implementation of the resolutions issued by this conference in view of the utmost importance of making these resolutions enter the phase of implementation and in view of their influence on the future and progress of the Islamic world.
- The conference decided to set up three permanent committees for scientific, technological, economic, trade, information and cultural co-operation. The task of these committees is to follow up the implementation of resolutions that have been and will be taken by the Islamic Conference in the aforementioned fields. Each committee is to be chaired by a Head of State.
- HM King Ḥasan II of Morocco's invitation to host the fourth Islamic summit in Morocco, was welcomed by the conference and accepted with deep appreciation.
- The member-states participating in the third summit expressed their sincere gratitude to HM King Khālid of Saudi Arabia, Prince Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz, Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister, the Saudi Government and hospitable people for the generosity, attention, excellent facilities and organizational arrangements provided for heads and delegation which had a major influence on the conduct of the sessions of the conference as planned and on the success of its work that took place in an admirable atmosphere of brotherhood, understanding and good consultation. We implore God to grant success to all.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station or monitoring service, where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

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2. On the problem posed by this group, see Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "The Fragmentation of Arab Politics: Inter-Arab Affairs Since the Afghanistan Invasion," *Orbis*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1981), pp. 389–407.
3. Chatti's interview with *al-Riyād*, 18 June—JPRS, 30 September 1980.
4. *Pravda*, 22 June 1980.
5. The details of the meeting and the plan were revealed in *'Ukāz*, 21 January—DR, 23 January 1981.
6. R. Moscow in Arabic, 21 June—SWB, Part 1, USSR, 9 July 1980.
7. MAP, 7 August—DR, 9 August 1980.
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11. Sādāt's speech, R. Cairo, 10 November—DR, 12 November 1980.
12. Sādāt's statement to Afghan delegation, R. Cairo, 26 December—DR, 29 December 1980.
13. MENA, 1 January—DR, 2 January 1981.

14. MAP, 9 November—DR, 14 November 1980.
15. R. Amman, 12 July—DR, 15 July 1980.
16. Final statement in *al-Ra'y*, 13 July—DR, 14 July 1980; addendum in DR, 17 July 1980.
17. Speech at conference opening, R. Amman, 11 July—DR, 15 July 1980.
18. Final statement in *al-Ra'y*, 13 July—DR, 14 July 1980.
19. Chatti's speech before Muslim Foreign Ministers, R. Rabat, 18 September—DR, 19 September 1980.
20. Final statement, R. Rabat, 18 August—DR, 19 August 1980.
21. *La Presse de Tunisie*, 25–26 August—JPRS, 2 October 1980.
22. Final statement, R. Rabat, 20 September—DR, 22 September 1980.
23. Interview with Chatti, R. Rabat, 5 November—DR, 7 November 1980.
24. Final statement, R. Rabat, 8 November—DR, 14 November 1980.
25. Accounts of the symposium and meeting in *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 2, 5 December 1980.
26. Chatti's interview with *al-Ra'y al-'Āmm*, 17 December 1980—JPRS, 13 January 1981.
27. Final statement, R. Rabat, 24 December—DR, 29 December 1969.
28. Versions of the document were reported in *Le Monde*, 22 January; *The Guardian*, 17, 19 January; *al-Madīna*, 18 January 1981.
29. "La conférence internationale sur la defense et le monde musulman," *L'Afrique et l'Asie modernes* (Paris), No. 122 (3rd trimestre, 1979), pp. 60–8.
30. Interview with Sa'ūd al-Faysal, Riyadh Television, 18 January—DR 19 January 1981.
31. R. Tehran, 5 November—DR, 7 November 1980.
32. Chatti's interview with *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 30 October—DR, 31 October 1980.
33. Chatti's interview with *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 30 October—DR, 31 October 1980.
34. AFP, 11 November—DR, 14 November 1980.
35. Chatti's interview with *al-Ra'y al-'Āmm*, 17 December 1980—JPRS, 13 January 1981.
36. *FT*, 23 January 1981.
37. *The Guardian*, 24 January; *IHT*, 24–25 January 1981.
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40. For details on the infrastructure, see *FT*, 31 January 1981.
41. Article by Georges de Bouteiller, in *Défense Nationale*, April—JPRS, 8 May 1981.
42. For the text of the Mecca Declaration, a statement of principles issued by the summit, see R. Riyadh, 28 January—DR, 29 January 1981. For the text of the summit resolutions and recommendations, see R. Riyadh, 29 January—SWB, 31 January 1981.
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48. JNA, 27 January—DR, 28 January; *FT*, 28 January; *DT*, 28 January 1981.
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50. R. Rabat, 25 April—SWB, 27 April 1981.
51. VoP, 1 June—DR, 3 June 1981.
52. *IHT*, 29 January 1981.
53. *Le Monde*, 29 January; *The Guardian*, 27 January 1981.
54. R. Damascus, 28 January—SWB, 30 January 1981.
55. *Eight Days*, 31 January 1981.
56. R. Riyadh, 26 January—DR, 28 January 1981.
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60. SUNA, 28 January—DR, 30 January 1981.
61. Text of Speech in INA, 28 January—SWB, 30 January 1981.
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65. *Al-Riyād*, 18 June—JPRS, 30 September 1980.
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74. *Al-Ayyām*, 5 March 1981.
75. R. Riyadh, 26 January—DR, 27 January 1981.
76. *Al-Jazīra*, 28 January 1981.
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83. R. Monte Carlo, 12 August 1981.
84. R. Monte Carlo, 13 October—DR, 14 October 1981.
85. R. Riyadh, 5 March—DR, 5 March 1981.
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105. Patrick Seale in *The Observer*, 20 December 1981.